
Summary
Shared threats can make cooperation more attractive, while enemy-based alliances can encourage polarized judgments, misplaced trust and fragile unity.
At a glance
A common threat may make joint action more valuable or each contribution more critical. But shared opposition does not establish a partner’s reliability; use positive goals, evidence and clear commitments to judge cooperation.
Two neighboring countries each operate a nuclear power station. Damage to either could harm people on both sides of the border. Protective investment would benefit both populations, but it is costly. Each country has a reason to hope the other will pay.
As a thought experiment, the situation makes a cooperation problem clear. When the shared danger feels remote, avoiding the expense can look attractive. If the cost of inaction becomes more pressing, joint protection can look more worthwhile than waiting for the neighbor to act.
The danger need not be a person. A natural hazard, a common practical problem or a competitor can all give otherwise separate parties a reason to coordinate. That is the appeal—and the complication—behind the phrase “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.”
How a shared threat can change cooperation
The common-enemy effect describes the possibility that a shared adversary or danger increases cooperation. A review by Kris De Jaegher distinguishes several accounts, including changes in how critical a contribution becomes, group interaction, coalition formation and rules for interpreting social relationships.
Those are related ideas, not one universal mechanism. A threat may make your contribution more important, create a reason to work with someone unfamiliar or bring an existing common interest into focus. Which happens depends on the situation and the incentives.
The nuclear-safety example illustrates why personal and collective interests can align. Helping the neighbor also helps protect your own population. Cooperation need not depend on suddenly feeling affection; a shared consequence can be sufficient reason to act.
This logic also appears in discussions of animal cooperation under difficult conditions. It does not establish that every harsh environment produces teamwork or that every individual must participate for a hunt to succeed. The relevant question is how circumstances change the payoff from helping or withholding help.
The risks inside an enemy-based alliance
Relationship shortcuts can divide the wider network
The Chinese article describes a contrast between two sets of rules for simulated agents. One follows the ideas that a friend's friend is a friend and a friend's enemy is an enemy. The other adds that an enemy's enemy is a friend and an enemy's friend is an enemy. It calls the second set Heider-style rules.
As a model illustration, the difference matters. The first rule set can keep cooperation within small familiar circles. The second offers a route to a larger alliance with strangers, provided they oppose the same party.
The account imagines relationship scores changing after cooperation or betrayal. It contrasts fragmented clusters with two large opposing blocs. These are possible consequences of simplified relationship rules, not evidence that every real society inevitably divides into two camps.
The practical risk is a narrowing basis for judgment. Someone's position toward an adversary can become more important than what they have actually done. A person outside the alliance may then be treated as untrustworthy before any direct interaction occurs.
Shared opposition can be mistaken for reliability
Having the same objection does not mean two people will contribute fairly. One may be committed to the shared task; another may enjoy the alliance while leaving others to do the work.
The model account uses defectors to illustrate this vulnerability. If access to trust depends mainly on declaring the right enemy, an uncooperative participant can appear acceptable without demonstrating reliable behavior.
That is a reason to judge contributions separately from allegiance. Agreement about what is wrong may start a conversation, but it does not answer who will do the work, how decisions will be made or whether commitments will be kept.
The alliance may lack a reason to continue
A group organized entirely around opposition may struggle when the immediate danger recedes. Members can discover that they have different aims, expectations or standards once the common pressure no longer settles priorities.
This is a risk rather than an inevitable collapse. Some alliances build habits, agreements and positive goals that outlast the original problem. Others have little holding them together beyond the wish to defeat something outside the group.
It is therefore worth asking what the cooperation is creating. A shared protective system has a purpose beyond disliking a threat. A group whose only activity is identifying enemies may find continuation dependent on finding another one.
Choose cooperation with more than fear in mind
Look beyond a single account of the conflict
When an alliance forms quickly, pause to examine the evidence behind its description of the threat. Seek relevant information from more than one perspective and distinguish disagreement from harmful conduct.
Exposure to different views is not a guaranteed cure for polarization. Its practical value is the opportunity to notice missing facts, challenge an assumption or discover that another person's position is more complicated than the group's summary suggests.
The same care applies to judging a potential partner. Ask about their behavior and commitments, rather than treating shared dislike as sufficient proof of character. Trust can develop through what people do together.
Make room for genuine discussion
Two-way communication matters because members may agree about the problem while disagreeing about the response. A group needs ways to question a proposal without having the question treated as betrayal.
Otherwise apparent unity may depend on blind conformity. People suppress concerns to avoid conflict, and the group loses information it needs to act well. Agreement is more useful when participants can explain why they accept a goal and what they are willing to contribute.
Discuss the practical basis of cooperation: the outcome you want, the responsibilities each person accepts and how you will know whether the arrangement is working. These questions turn a feeling of solidarity into something assessable.
Build something the alliance can stand for
A common danger can provide a legitimate reason to work together quickly. There is no need to reject cooperation simply because fear played a part in beginning it.
The more durable question is what follows. Can the group name a constructive purpose, judge partners fairly and reconsider its assumptions? Can it keep helping when the immediate excitement of opposition fades?
Shared threats can bring people to the same table. Shared goals and reliable conduct give them reasons to keep working there.
Frequently asked questions
Must a common enemy be a person?
No. It can be a hazard or shared practical problem.
Does threat always increase cooperation?
No. The literature includes different conditional mechanisms, not a universal rule.
Why can shared opposition mislead trust?
It says little by itself about contribution, reliability or future aims.
How can an alliance last?
Develop a constructive purpose, clear responsibilities and room for genuine questions.

