The Quiet Omen / Meaning Making

Meritocracy’s Hidden Flaw: How Luck Shapes Effort

Meritocracy rewards talent and effort, but research shows how luck and environment also shape motivation, choices, achievement, and fairness.

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Two diverse workers face unequal conditions while performing similar tasks in a contemporary studio

Summary

Effort is visible, but the forces that encourage or suppress it often are not. Research on shallow meritocracy reveals why people may recognize unequal conditions yet still judge unequal outcomes as fair.

At a glance

Meritocracy promises that talent and effort should determine rewards, but both can be shaped by luck, opportunity, and environment. Research suggests that people often reward observed effort without fully accounting for the conditions that influenced it. Even if this is a practical response to limited information, achievement should not be treated as proof of moral worth.

Meritocracy: What Is Flawed About Believing Effort Brings Success?

“Meritocracy is the dampness that follows us throughout life” and “How can we distinguish meritocracy from healthy ambition?” Questions like these have become prominent topics of conversation among young people in China. At the time of writing, the hashtag for meritocracy had attracted nearly 20 million views and 100,000 discussions on Xiaohongshu, along with 1.38 million views and more than 2,000 discussions on Zhihu. What exactly is meritocracy, what problems might it create, and how should we understand it? The term “meritocracy” comes from the work of Harvard philosopher Michael J. Sandel.

Meritocracy and Its Dark Side

Meritocracy is the belief that social and economic rewards should be allocated according to merit—especially talent, effort, and achievement. On this view, more capable and hardworking people deserve higher status and income. Most modern societies, including China and the United States, accept some version of this principle. Its ideal is compelling: people should compete under conditions of equal opportunity, free from advantages or obstacles created by family background and other circumstances beyond their control. Whatever their starting point, they should be able to advance through their own abilities and efforts. At its core lies the promise that no one should be rewarded or held back for reasons they cannot control.

Yet in The Tyranny of Merit, philosopher Michael Sandel argues that the ideal’s dark side is rooted in its most attractive promise: that people can master their own fate and make themselves. But this promise of self-mastery and self-realization also imposes an almost unbearable burden. If each person’s destiny truly rests entirely in their own hands, and wealth and status arise solely from talent and effort, winners can easily develop a powerful sense that they deserve their position. They may become intoxicated with their success, forgetting the timing and good fortune that helped them achieve it, while believing that others have only themselves to blame for their failures. This is what produces the arrogance of elites.

In reality, influences beyond personal control are difficult to remove. Students, for example, may be randomly assigned to classes whose teachers differ in quality. If one class has an unusually strong mathematics teacher and another has an unusually strong language teacher, later differences in performance cannot confidently be attributed entirely to the students’ talent and effort. The problem runs deeper than test scores. A student inspired by a mathematics teacher may develop an intense interest in that subject, devote far less energy to others, and eventually show a highly uneven academic profile. The effort appears to be the student’s own, but the direction and intensity of that effort have also been shaped by the environment. How much responsibility should the student bear for the resulting position?

This reveals a contradiction within meritocratic thought. Meritocracy tries to make rewards depend on talent and effort while excluding the effects of environment, opportunity, and other uncontrollable conditions. But talent and effort are not independent of those conditions; they can themselves be formed, encouraged, weakened, or constrained by them.

Experimental Research: How Do People Judge Environmental Effects on Effort?

In 2024, the Review of Economic Studies published economist Peter Andre’s paper “Shallow Meritocracy,” which asks what happens when an uncontrollable external condition affects how hard someone works. If an unfair environment suppresses a person’s motivation, should that person receive compensation? In the principal online experiment, Andre recruited 653 U.S. participants to act as judges. They were told about two workers performing a simple, repetitive piece-rate task and choosing how many units to complete. Worker A had been randomly assigned a rate of $0.50 per unit, while worker B had been assigned $0.10. The pay disparity therefore resulted from luck rather than either worker’s choice. Andre also conducted follow-up experiments involving thousands of participants to test alternative explanations, cognitive mechanisms, and generalizability; the samples’ demographic characteristics reflected those of the broader U.S. population.

In each scenario, the two workers completed 50 units in total, and the seven constructed scenarios were presented in random order. In scenario 1, A completed all 50 units and earned $25 at $0.50 per unit, while B completed no work and earned nothing. In scenario 2, A completed 45 units and earned $22.50, while B completed five units and earned $0.50 at $0.10 per unit. Thus, A performed 90% of the work but received 98% of their combined income. Each judge evaluated eight scenarios: the seven constructed by the researchers and an eighth based on two real workers whom the researchers had recruited and randomly assigned piece rates of either $0.50 or $0.10. Most judges believed that all eight scenarios were real, although the analysis used only the seven constructed cases. For each scenario, the judges decided how to redistribute the two workers’ earnings, with the option of leaving the original allocation unchanged.

The experiment varied one crucial detail: when the workers learned their pay rates. Half of the judges were told that the workers discovered their rates only after completing all their work. In this control condition, the rate could not have influenced how much they chose to do, so output represented their baseline effort. The other judges were told that the workers knew their rates before beginning. Under this condition, the randomly assigned environment could affect motivation: $0.50 per unit could encourage A to work more, while $0.10 could discourage B. The judges understood this mechanism. In a supplementary experiment, they estimated that a worker offered $0.50 per unit would choose to complete 3.46 times as much work as one offered $0.10.

Judges generally transferred some income from A to B until each worker’s share of income roughly matched that worker’s share of completed work. If B had done 10% of the work, for example, B was typically assigned about 10% of the total income rather than the original share of roughly 2%. More importantly, statistical analysis found no significant difference between decisions made when workers learned their rates after finishing and decisions made when they knew the rates beforehand. As a group, judges did not award B additional compensation merely because the low rate could have reduced B’s motivation and B might have worked more under equal conditions. This result does not mean that no individual judge considered the environment; it means the two experimental conditions did not produce a statistically significant difference overall.

Such compensation requires counterfactual thinking: imagining what could have happened but did not. The relevant question is, “If B had received the same favorable rate as A, how much would B have worked?” Andre found that uncertainty about this counterfactual explained part of the reluctance to compensate. In a follow-up experiment with 314 judges, participants were explicitly told that B would have completed 50% of the total work if paid the same rate as A. Once this uncertainty was removed, some judges gave B more.

Even then, judgments remained divided. In one case, B had actually completed 30% of the work under unequal pay, but the judges were told that B would have completed 50% in the counterfactual scenario. In 30% of trials, they assigned B 50% of the income. In 35% of trials, they still assigned B only 30%, matching B's actual share of the work. In about 15% of trials, they did not redistribute the income at all, leaving B with roughly 10% of the total and A with roughly 90%.

Andre interprets these allocations as expressions of different ideas about fairness. “Actual-choice meritocrats” distribute income according to the choices people actually made and the effort they actually exerted, regardless of whether uncontrollable conditions influenced those choices. They also decline to reward counterfactual potential. In open-ended responses, such judges reasoned that even if B would have completed half the work at the higher rate, B did not in fact do so; transferring income from A would therefore take money away from the person who actually performed the work.

“Comparable-choice meritocrats,” by contrast, consider what people would choose under comparable conditions. They may reason that B completed less only because of a randomly assigned low rate, while A’s greater effort and income also benefited from luck, and therefore divide the income equally. Yet they tend to do this only when they receive definite information that B would have worked as hard as A under equal conditions. Reliable counterfactual knowledge is rare in real life. When it is unavailable, comparable-choice meritocrats behave much like actual-choice meritocrats.

Using data from a series of experiments, Andre built a model estimating the distribution of these fairness principles in the population represented by the U.S. sample. The estimates were approximately 40% actual-choice meritocrats, 28% comparable-choice meritocrats, 16% libertarians who never redistributed and always accepted the original unequal allocation, and 15% egalitarians who consistently divided the income equally. These are model-based estimates tied to a U.S. sample, not universal population figures.

Several follow-up scenarios brought the problem closer to ordinary life. In one, person A had grown up in an elite family, received a high-quality education, and repeatedly heard that hard work would be rewarded. Person B had grown up in poverty, lacked a good education, and was repeatedly taught that effort was useless. A consequently worked harder and earned more. A total of 1,222 judges considered the case and decided whether some of A’s income should be redistributed to B. The same tension reappeared: only 27% considered the unequal childhood environments fair, yet 82% considered the resulting difference in income fair.

The researchers conclude that, because of either a belief in actual-choice meritocracy or uncertainty about counterfactual outcomes, a majority of people tend to align workers’ income with their observed effort without accounting for how environment and luck influence effort itself. This reveals a deep contradiction in meritocratic logic: meritocracy ostensibly holds that people should not be responsible for circumstances beyond their control, yet in practice it makes them bear the consequences of choices shaped by those very circumstances. This is the sense in which meritocracy is “shallow.”

What This Means: Achievement Is Not Effort, and Achievement Is Not Moral Worth

Andre suggests viewing shallow meritocracy from two sides. First, it is both inconsistent and harmful. Disadvantaged people already face obstacles created by poor conditions or bad luck. If those same conditions weaken their motivation or prevent them from developing valuable abilities, they may then be condemned as lazy or incompetent. They are punished once by their circumstances and again for the effects those circumstances have produced. Talent—including intelligence, knowledge, and skill—is no more independent of inherited and acquired conditions than effort is.

On the other hand, shallow meritocracy may be a necessary compromise with reality. We can observe what someone does, but we often cannot see all the forces that enabled or obstructed the action. We can see a person’s present position without knowing the road that led there. In a world of severely limited information, holding people responsible for their observable choices and conduct may serve as a simple, practical rule. This raises ancient questions about whether human actions arise from free will or are determined, whether freedom and determinism can coexist, and what moral responsibility means if behavior is partly determined. Those philosophical disputes lie beyond the scope of this discussion.

A practical rule for judging actions, however, must not become a measure of moral worth. Sandel warns against treating material success as proof that someone morally deserves what they have. Talent, opportunity, timing, and environmental support are not things anyone can claim to have earned in advance. Recognizing their influence should make successful people more humble, strengthen solidarity with other members of society, and encourage contributions to the common good. Psychologist and social reformer John W. Gardner makes the corresponding point that achievement should not be confused with a person’s value. Respect for another human being should never depend on that person’s success.

Pierre Bourdieu offers a concise version of the same response in The Weight of the World, invoking a maxim from Spinoza: do not lament, ridicule, or hate—seek to understand.

Frequently asked questions

What is meritocracy?

Meritocracy is the belief that social and economic rewards should be allocated according to merit—especially talent, effort, and achievement. Its ideal assumes equal opportunity without advantages or obstacles created by circumstances beyond a person’s control.

Why does meritocracy have a dark side?

If wealth and status are treated as products solely of talent and effort, successful people may overlook timing and good fortune while blaming others for failure. Sandel describes the resulting attitude as the arrogance of elites.

What did Peter Andre’s experiment find?

Judges generally aligned each worker’s income with that worker’s observed share of completed work. Overall, decisions did not differ significantly according to whether workers learned their randomly assigned pay rates before or after working, although some judges compensated more when given definite counterfactual information.

Does the article reject effort or personal responsibility?

No. It acknowledges that judging observable choices may be a practical rule when the forces shaping behavior cannot be known. Its warning is that this rule should not turn achievement into a measure of moral worth or treat talent and effort as independent of luck and environment.

Are the estimated fairness types universal?

No. The estimated shares of actual-choice meritocrats, comparable-choice meritocrats, libertarians, and egalitarians were model-based and tied to a U.S. sample, not universal population figures.