
Summary
A friend's car troubles, an exam ritual, or a vivid memory can feel convincing. These examples explore six thinking errors and a proposed method for weighing evidence and competing explanations.
At a glance
Six common thinking errors are favoring stories over evidence, seeking confirmation, overlooking coincidence, trusting perception too readily, oversimplifying judgments, and trusting reconstructed memories. A proposed four-step method is to clarify the claim, examine the evidence, consider alternative hypotheses, and assess each explanation's reasonableness. Confidence should reflect evidence quality, including evidence against a preferred belief.
Do you believe in ghosts? Do you think mediums can speak with the dead? These questions open a skeptical discussion of a book about cognitive pitfalls and six common thinking errors.
One person might answer, “I don’t just believe in ghosts. I’ve seen one.” Another might be equally emphatic: “Absolutely not. I’m a committed materialist.”
The discussion’s writer imagines posting those questions on social media and hearing from people insisting that ghosts exist. Some might claim firsthand encounters; others might describe a medium who supposedly spoke with the dead and supplied remarkably accurate information. Enough confident accounts could make even a firm skeptic reconsider. Their persuasive force would not establish that the encounters happened as described or that a supernatural explanation was correct.
We can leave those questions unresolved here while considering what belief can do. Someone might pray before an exam, hoping for divine help. After watching a horror film, a person might ask a roommate to accompany them to the bathroom in the middle of the night. Belief can shape behavior even when the underlying claim remains unsettled.
Beliefs are what we accept as true, and they influence everyday decisions. Thinking errors can lead us to mistake pseudoscience for science, an unreasonable claim for a reasonable one, something nonexistent for something real, or a wrong answer for a correct one. We may then act confidently on those judgments. How does evidence that deserves caution come to feel so convincing?
When a story outweighs the evidence
Imagine you are preparing to buy a car. You have read the test reports, and its performance measures look good. You remember that a friend owns the same model. The next day, that friend tells you what a disappointment it has been: repairs every few months and an assortment of other problems. Would you still buy it? The writer predicts that many people would question their choice; some would abandon the purchase altogether.
This illustrates the first error: giving a story more weight than other evidence. The writer reports research finding that people are more inclined to trust stories than statistical data, then offers an explanation rooted in our social nature. Other people’s experiences attract us, and we respond strongly to stories. That helps explain their influence without making them a sound foundation for belief. We can also become preoccupied with how much evidence we have while neglecting its quality and whether it reasonably supports our conclusion.
Cars from any brand can vary in quality. Suppose 99% of this model’s cars were trouble-free, while 1% were defective. Your friend could have bought one of that unlucky minority. These hypothetical proportions show how one person’s experience might give a misleading impression of the model as a whole.
Collecting more stories does not automatically solve the problem. Fifty anecdotes do not establish greater reliability than one merely because there are fifty of them. When stories dominate our judgment, they can crowd out useful information, including statistics that put an individual experience in perspective. Statistical data often provide more reliable guidance, though numbers themselves offer no guarantee of correctness.
Protecting a preferred belief
What we want to believe can shape which evidence we take seriously. The second error is seeking confirmation of beliefs we already hold. We may focus on supporting information while ignoring, downplaying, or even ridiculing competing explanations. Contrary evidence need not escape our attention: we can notice it and find reasons to dismiss it.
Imagine researchers whose paper has been rejected. They might blame excessively harsh or arbitrary reviewers rather than consider weaknesses in their research. That reaction would not establish why the paper was rejected. It shows how a preferred explanation can prevent an uncomfortable possibility from receiving serious consideration.
Giving coincidence a hidden cause
A favorable coincidence can be especially persuasive when it seems to confirm something we want to believe. A ritual precedes a hoped-for result, and we may credit mysterious powers without considering whether chance explains the sequence. This is the third error: overlooking coincidence.
The writer reports an unidentified study finding that 20%–33% of the students studied used superstitious practices to seek luck in exams. The accompanying examples include wearing particular clothes, using a particular pen, listening to lucky songs, knocking on the exam-room door, walking around a building, and reposting material involving a person associated with good luck. These illustrate ways of seeking good fortune, rather than demonstrated improvements in exam performance.
The writer explains how such beliefs can persist: we remember when a ritual and a favorable result coincided while overlooking the times they did not. The behavior and the outcome might have no connection beyond chance, yet wanting a connection can make us perceive one. When the hoped-for result fails to recur, we may find an excuse that preserves the belief.
In an unpredictable world, superstition can offer a sense of control. A ritual gives us something to do amid uncertainty and a feeling that our actions influence the outcome. That feeling helps explain its appeal without establishing actual control.
Seeing what we expect
Expectation can shape even what we think we see. The fourth error is assuming that perception shows us the world exactly as it is. “I know what I saw” expresses confidence, but confidence does not guarantee accuracy. We may miss something real because our attention is elsewhere, or believe we see something absent because we expect it to appear.
The writer recounts an incident abroad as a real example. After media reports that a dangerous bear had escaped from a zoo, residents began calling the police with sightings. Some said it had crossed a park; others reported it searching trash cans in a back alley. From the calls, the bear seemed to be turning up all over the city. Yet according to the account, it remained within 100 meters of the zoo, wandering nearby without visiting any of the reported locations.
Now imagine someone who believes a full moon makes people behave strangely. On the next full-moon night, they watch closely and notice plenty of unusual behavior. Each instance seems to support a connection with the moon. The writer’s explanation is that such behavior occurs at other times too; expecting it on that particular night prompts a deliberate search that makes it more noticeable. The observations feel like confirmation without establishing that the moon caused anything. Expectation can thus “create” a perception by shaping what we notice and how we interpret it.
Simplifying away relevant information
Accurate judgments require useful information, yet everyday life is complicated, and the internet supplies more information than we can easily handle. We look for shortcuts. The fifth error arises when those shortcuts leave out information that matters.
Imagine interviewing a man chosen at random on the street. He seems helpful but somewhat shy and withdrawn. He likes things orderly and pays close attention to detail. Which occupation seems most likely: farmer, salesperson, pilot, librarian, or doctor? The writer predicts that most people would choose librarian because the description resembles a familiar stereotype.
A resemblance that comes readily to mind can crowd out less obvious information. More broadly, such judgments can neglect base rates—how common something is in the relevant population—as well as sample size and regression toward the mean. In this occupation question, the crucial missing background is how many people work in each field.
The writer challenges the librarian answer by arguing that shops greatly outnumber libraries, with a correspondingly larger sales workforce. Even if salespeople seem less characteristically shy or withdrawn, a much larger occupational group could still include many shy people. Shy salespeople might even far outnumber librarians. This possibility does not tell us what the man actually does. It shows why a vague personality description, without relevant population data, gives us less reason for confidence than its resemblance to a stereotype suggests.
Trusting a memory because it returns
The sixth error concerns memory. When we complain that our memory is poor, we often mean that we cannot bring something to mind. We assume the event remains stored somewhere, intact but temporarily out of reach. Once it returns, we may feel certain that we remember it accurately.
The writer explains that later experiences can alter memories of earlier events without our noticing. Remembering reconstructs the past and may incorporate imagined details—or even an imagined account of what happened. Each time we recall an event, we reconstruct our memory of it again. Successive reconstructions can take it farther from what actually occurred. A recollection can therefore feel convincing without being accurate, even when retrieving it takes no effort.
Examining a belief before accepting it
These errors point to two things we need to assess: the quality of the evidence and whether the belief itself is reasonable. Unverified claims deserve skepticism and a willingness to test them. We need to examine the reliability of evidence both for and against a claim, then let that assessment determine our confidence.
The writer argues that if a belief cannot be tested, we cannot establish whether it is true or false. Its truth remains unresolved; untestability does not itself make it false.
For putting these standards into practice, the two thinkers cited by the writer propose a four-step method.
The first step is to state the claim as clearly and specifically as possible. Before deciding whether to believe something, we need to know precisely what we are being asked to accept. An ambiguous claim leaves room for evasion and cannot be properly tested.
The second step is to examine the evidence. Evidence carries different weight: anecdotes can mislead, perception and memory can be distorted, and even scientific research can be wrong. Support for or opposition to a claim should depend on evidence quality as well as quantity.
The third step in their method is to consider alternative hypotheses. A phenomenon may have several possible explanations, yet the desire for confirmation can keep us focused on the one we already favor. Searching more widely may reveal equally persuasive evidence for a competing explanation. We need to consider those alternatives and assess the evidence supporting them, without assuming that our first explanation must be right or that every alternative deserves equal weight.
The fourth step is to assess how reasonable each competing hypothesis is. They propose three questions: Can it be tested? Is it the simplest explanation of the phenomenon? Does it conflict with other accepted knowledge? These questions guide comparison; neither simplicity nor agreement with existing knowledge alone establishes truth.
Seeking alternatives becomes harder when the information we encounter keeps reinforcing the same view. Returning to the six thinking errors, the writer argues that recommendation algorithms can make them easier to fall into: view one type of post, and the system keeps recommending similar material. Fewer encounters with challenging information can leave mistakes uncorrected and allow them to become more deeply entrenched.
Before forming beliefs and making decisions, we need to think like scientists: put our hypotheses to the test.
Frequently asked questions
Does collecting more anecdotes automatically make evidence reliable?
No. More anecdotes do not by themselves establish reliability. Evidence quality and whether the evidence supports the conclusion also matter; statistical data can provide useful perspective but are not guaranteed to be correct.
Does an untestable belief have to be false?
The writer argues that an untestable belief leaves its truth unresolved. Untestability does not itself make the belief false.
What questions does the proposed method use to compare explanations?
It asks whether each hypothesis can be tested, whether it is the simplest explanation of the phenomenon, and whether it conflicts with other accepted knowledge. Neither simplicity nor agreement with existing knowledge alone establishes truth.


