The Quiet Omen / Pattern Recognition

Behavioral Economics: How Psychology Shapes Decisions

Explore behavioral economics through a guessing game, bounded rationality, emotions and two examples of how behavioral insights may inform policy.

Explore this hub Psychology
Three adults consider abstract choices around a table while observing one another’s gestures.

Summary

A guessing game reveals a gap between recursive calculation and actual choices, opening a discussion of bounded rationality, empathy, defaults and public policy.

At a glance

Behavioral economics brings psychological insights into economic thinking about decisions. The account uses a guessing game to explore how rational calculation interacts with limited cognitive capacity, emotion and expectations about other people. It also considers how defaults and social cues might inform public policy.

As deadlines approach, which should come first: an article for the publication or a literature review for a research-group meeting? The writer discussing a book on economics and psychology describes facing that choice alongside a less pressing one: whether to have McDonald’s for lunch.

People differ in how much importance they attach to a decision, but many choices involve tradeoffs. Even opening this article raises questions about costs and benefits. Why read this one rather than another? How much time will you spend on it, and what will you gain?

Human decision-making interests researchers in many fields. The writer singles out economics and psychology as the two disciplines that have devoted the most attention and effort to understanding it. Their meeting produces a metaphorical child: economic psychology, also called behavioral economics in this account. A guessing game brings their different assumptions into focus and offers a taste of what their combination can reveal.

Imagine the writer giving every reader a slip of paper. Each person writes down a number from zero to one hundred. Whoever chooses the number closest to half the average of everyone’s choices wins a mystery gift from the writer. For this imagined game, assume the gift is something you would very much like to receive.

Before reading on, what number would you write down?

Under the traditional economic reasoning presented here, a rational player writes down zero. That may seem surprising, but consider how the reasoning unfolds. Suppose everyone chooses one hundred. The average is then one hundred, and half of it is fifty. Everyone else wants to win too, however, and can make the same calculation. If they all choose fifty instead, the average falls to fifty, making twenty-five the new target.

Should you choose twenty-five, then? The other players can anticipate that step as well. Each time you halve the number, they can follow the same reasoning. Continuing this process brings everyone’s choices closer and closer to zero.

The writer traces this reasoning to two assumptions of traditional economics. The first is that people seek to maximize their utility. In simple settings, utility can mean happiness or satisfaction; in business, it often means profit. In the extreme model of homo economicus, utility depends entirely on monetary returns.

The second assumption is that people have a degree of rationality. In Ananish Chaudhuri’s explanation, rational decision-makers can clearly calculate costs and benefits, exercise foresight, and make complex calculations about the future. The writer connects the two assumptions: these rational capacities supply the tools people need to maximize utility.

But does choosing zero on those assumptions actually win when people play the game just once?

The writer reports a different result from Rosemarie Nagel’s 1995 research associated with Pompeu-Fabra University: when the game was played just once, the winning number was near thirteen. Few participants chose zero or anything close to it. Choices clustered at fifty, thirty, twenty-five, and between ten and seventeen, with roughly half falling below seventeen. The writer interprets this pattern as suggesting that people commonly stopped after only a few steps of reasoning—around fifty at the first step, twenty-five at the second, or twelve and a half at the third—rather than continuing toward zero.

The gap between this reasoning and actual choices may feel familiar. The writer offers two everyday examples of apparent irrationality: Little R opens a game and starts its daily tasks with a deadline looming; Little Y arrives at an eight a.m. class carrying a Luckin coffee after resolving to quit for what feels like the hundredth time. Dan Ariely of Duke University characterizes humans as predictably irrational: irrational behavior can still be predictable to some degree.

The writer describes bounded rationality as a common starting point for psychologists. In the explanation given by the authority cited earlier for rationality, our cognitive capacities are limited. We face constraints on time, computational ability, and foresight, and we are frequently susceptible to bias and errors of judgment.

Limits on calculation are only part of the account. The writer also points to emotions, empathy, social norms, and habitual ways of thinking as influences on decisions. One distinction drawn here between psychological and economic approaches is whether they explicitly consider emotion in a broad sense, including intuition and sympathy. Economic psychology brings these psychological insights into economic thinking.

Return to the guessing game. Choosing a number involves calculation, but the writer argues that trying to win also calls for empathy: a sense of how the other players are approaching the task. It is only a small game, and they may spend little time thinking it through. Numerical reasoning therefore needs to work together with sensitivity to their likely state of mind. The writer describes this interaction as reason “fermenting” through emotion or passion and sees it as the essence of behavioral economics.

That concern with how people actually decide extends beyond a game. Behavioral economics covers a broad range of questions, with irrational behavior among its prominent concerns. The writer suggests that understanding such behavior could help improve public policy and offers two examples.

The first compares organ-donation choices on driver’s license applications in two countries. In one, applicants must check a box if they want to become organ donors. In the other, the form assumes they are willing to donate their organs after death and asks them to check a box if they wish to decline. The writer reports markedly higher organ-donation rates in the second country, even when the two countries are geographical neighbors.

The writer calls this a framing effect, explaining it through the change in defaults: changing the default option can produce a large change in behavior. The proposal is to use that influence in social-welfare policy to give goodwill greater reach.

The second example concerns unattended shops selling sweet drinks. Most customers leave payment, but some leave without paying. Drawing a pair of eyes on the cabinet, the writer reports, encourages more customers to pay, even though the eyes are obviously artificial. The intervention is a depicted gaze.

The writer interprets this as suggesting that trust between people may have roots in human nature and may be easier to awaken than we expect. Even an artificial gaze may prompt people to behave more trustworthily in social situations. This tendency, the writer proposes, could help public services operate more effectively.

Much remains to be understood about how we make decisions and the different forms irrational behavior takes. What do we get right, and where do we go wrong? What roles do bias and intuition play? How do decisions about ourselves differ from those concerning other people or society as a whole? And how might understanding these differences help us design better policies? These are among the questions behavioral economics seeks to answer.

Frequently asked questions

What does bounded rationality mean in this account?

Bounded rationality recognizes limited cognitive capacities, constraints on time, computational ability and foresight, and susceptibility to bias and errors of judgment.

Why was the winning number near thirteen rather than zero?

In the writer’s report of Rosemarie Nagel’s 1995 research, the winning number was near thirteen when the game was played just once. The writer interprets the choices as suggesting that participants commonly stopped after a few steps of reasoning rather than continuing toward zero.